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Advice is cheap : information is not!
Häfner, Samuel; Taylor, Curtis R. - 2017
An entrepreneur contracts with a consultant, who is protected by limited liability, to supply information about the state of a project prior to investing in it. For a given level of investment, a good project succeeds with higher probability than a bad one. The entrepreneur makes an upfront...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012117630
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Reputation building with endogenous speed of learning
Pei, Harry - 2019
I study reputation models in which information about the long-run player's past behavior is dispersed among short …-run players. I identify two challenges to reputation building when such information is aggregated via the short-run players …-run player's current period action, I propose a resistent to learning condition under which reputation fails. This is because the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012169393
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Advice Is Cheap : Information Is Not!
Häfner, Samuel - 2018
An entrepreneur contracts with a consultant, who is protected by limited liability, to supply information about the state of a project prior to investing in it. For a given level of investment, a good project succeeds with higher probability than a bad one. The entrepreneur makes an upfront...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932515
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Voronoi languages : equilibria in cheap-talk games with high–dimensional types and few signals
Jäger, Gerhard; Koch-Metzger, Lars; Riedel, Frank - 2009
We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into convex categories. We give a full characterization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003921430
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Mechanim design and intentions
Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2014 - Revised version, April 2014
We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010354632
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Mechanism design and intentions
Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2016
We introduce intention-based social preferences into mechanism design. We explore information structures that dier with respect to what is commonly known about the weight that agents attach to reciprocal kindness. When the designer has no information on reciprocity types, implementability of an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444226
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Incentives and Equilibrium in Agency with Adverse Selection
Faynzilberg, Peter S. - 2015
We show that contracting in agency with voluntary participation may involve incentives for the agent's abstention. Their provision alters the optimality criteria in the principal's decision-making, further distorts the mechanism, and may lead to breakdown of contracting in circumstances where...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013021575
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Signaling motives in lying games
Fries, Tilman - 2021
This paper studies the implications of agents signaling their moral type in a lying game. In the theoretical analysis, a signaling motive emerges where agents dislike being suspected of lying and where some types of liars are more stigmatized than others. The equilibrium prediction of the model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012500269
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Rewarding mediocrity? : optimal regulation of R&D markets with reputation concerns
Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2017
counterpart where such a scheme can never be optimal. Our model also exhibits reputation dynamics which capture a pervasive view …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011623886
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The forward-looking disclosures of corporate managers : theory and evidence
Gropp, Reint; Karapandža, Raša; Opferkuch, Julian - 2016
We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011504350