We examine the incentives for a government to levy an optimal tariff on a foreign monopolist with unknown costs. With complete information, the home government uses tariffs to extract rents and implements a discriminatory policy that imposes higher tariffs on the more efficient monopolist. If...

This paper characterizes analytically the optimal tariff of a large one-sector economy with monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity in general equilibrium, thereby extending the small-country results of Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (JIE, 2009) and the homogeneous firms framework of Gros...

We explore how outcomes of trade policy retaliation (Nash tariff games) are affected when trade simultaneously takes places geographically across countries and through time via financial intermediation. In such models deficits and surpluses in goods trade are endogenously determined, and...

This paper introduces a number of game-theoretic tools to model collusive agreements among firms in vertically differentiated markets. I firstly review some classical literature on collusion between two firms producing goods of exogenous different qualities. I then extend the analysis to a...

We prove that a sufficient condition for the core existence in a n-firm vertically differentiated market is that the qualities of firms' products are equally-spaced along the quality spectrum. This result contributes to see that a fully collusive agreement among firms in such markets is more...

This paper characterizes analytically the optimal tariff of a large one-sector economy with monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity in general equilibrium, thereby extending the small-country results of Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (JIE, 2009) and the homogeneous firms framework of Gros...

In this paper we examine the issue of optimal tariffs for a small economy that trades with a large economy. We define "small" and "large" in the sense that the world prices are determined solely by the large country, and, therefore, the small country faces exogenously given world prices. Within...

In a model with cost-based informational asymmetry and trade policy determined endogenously, we show that tariffs and import-quotas have different sensitivities to the signal sent by the private agents to the home government. Specifically, the optimal quota is shown to be more sensitive than the...