by destroying his or her own endowment. We focus on how stake size (endowment) and emotions influence responses in China … responder has over his or her actions via emotion regulation. Finally, comparing our data with existing data for countries in …

by destroying his or her own endowment. We focus on how stake size (endowment) and emotions influence responses in China … responder has over his or her actions via emotion regulation. Finally, comparing our data with existing data for countries in …

We design a laboratory experiment in which an interested third party endowed with private information sends a public …

experiment, subjects are asked to choose between a selfish option and an altruistic option. Under the altruistic option, the … pessimistic than they truly are. Given the experiment design, the only plausible explanation for such a discrepancy is that …

manipulation through verifiable information disclosure by an informed mediator in such games. A utility model is introduced to …

We introduce experimental persuasion between Sender and Receiver. Sender chooses an experiment to perform from a … feasible set of experiments. Receiver observes the realization of this experiment and chooses an action. We characterize … the experiment. Our model includes Bayesian persuasion as the special case in which every experiment is feasible; however …