This article analyzes the role of information in building reputation in an investment/trust game. The model allows for information asymmetry in a finitely repeated sender-receiver game and solves for sequential equilibrium to show that if there are some trustworthy managers who always disclose...

Information disclosure is important for the economic well-being of society. Furthermore, given various issues, such as disclosure related to corporate social responsibility and scientific communication between scientists and society, the state of information disclosure is closely related to...

Incentives affect the manner in which auditors conduct their audits and one important research question is how different types of incentives affect behavior. The objectives of this paper are to examine how auditors' intrinsic motivation could be augmented by their participation in developing the...

We consider a dynamic model featuring two firms that test a regulator’s enforcement propensity through their misconduct and a regulator that disciplines them to build a reputation for strict enforcement. We show that when the regulator has full discretion over the enforcement criterion, peer...