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Can communication mitigate strategic delays in investment timing?
Mermer, Ayse; Onderstal, Sander; Sonnemans, Joep - 2022
introducing communication into this setting reduces strategic delay. We implement our model in a laboratory experiment utilizing a … experiment, while coordination failures emerge in the following periods sweeping away the beneficial effect of communication at …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013375345
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Experimental Persuasion
Ball, Ian; Espín-Sánchez, José-Antonio - 2021
We introduce experimental persuasion between Sender and Receiver. Sender chooses an experiment to perform from a … feasible set of experiments. Receiver observes the realization of this experiment and chooses an action. We characterize … the experiment. Our model includes Bayesian persuasion as the special case in which every experiment is feasible; however …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013215572
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The Streetlight Effect in Data-Driven Exploration
Hoelzemann, Johannes; Manso, Gustavo; Nagaraj, Abhishek; … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2024
exploration and lower individual and group payoffs. We test our predictions in an online lab experiment and show that the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014544680
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Cautious belief formation
Bleile, Jörg - 2014
We provide an axiomatic approach to a belief formation process in an informational environment characterized by limited, heterogenous and differently precise information. For a list of previously observed cases an agent needs to express her belief by assigning probabilities to possible outcomes....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010356678
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Can Agents Add and Subtract When Forming Beliefs?
Kieren, Pascal - 2020
Bayes' Theorem has an implicit, fundamental rule of how subjects should incorporate informationally equivalent signals of opposite direction: two opposite-directional signals should cancel out such that prior beliefs remain constant. In this study, we test whether agents always follow this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012829080
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An eye-tracking study of feature-based choice in one-shot games
Devetag, Giovanna; Di Guida, Sibilla; Polonio, Luca - 2013
We analyze subjects' eye movements while they make decisions in a series of one-shot games. The majority of them perform a partial and selective analysis of the payoff matrix, often ignoring the payoffs of the opponent and/or paying attention only to specific cells. Our results suggest that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009709528
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A note on empathy in games
Grohn, Jan; Huck, Steffen; Valasek, Justin Mattias - 2014
In this note we shall discuss a concept that - despite its prominence in both Hume (1739) and Smith (1759), its obvious relevance for social behavior, and its not so infrequent use in colloquial language - has never gained a foothold in economic theory: the concept of empathy. Specifically, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010233986
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Easy Money? Managerial Power and the Option Backdating Game Revisited
Guthrie, Graeme - 2020
This paper presents a model of a firm that backdates the granting of executive stock options in order to maximize actual compensation for a given level of reported compensation. The model is used to estimate the magnitude of the difference between the actual and reported values of option grants....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012857024
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Optimal deadlines for agreements
Damiano, Ettore; Li, Hao; Suen, Wing-chuen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 2, pp. 357-393
time that would allow efficient information aggregation in equilibrium. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690720
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Persuading the principal to wait
Orlov, Dmitry; Skrzypacz, Andrzej; Zryumov, Pavel - 2018 - Current Version: 11th January, 2018
A principal decides when to exercise a real option. A biased agent influences this decision by strategically disclosing information. Committing to disclose all information with delay is the optimal way to persuade the principal to wait. Without dynamic commitment, this promise is credible only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864710