Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 2,827
Cover Image
Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium
Okada, Akira - In: Games and economic behavior 128 (2021), pp. 193-201
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012672078
Cover Image
Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market
Bester, Helmut - 2021
This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648091
Cover Image
Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market
Bester, Helmut - 2021
This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587476
Cover Image
A Note on Asymmetric and Mixed Strategy Equilibria in the Search-Theoretic Model of Fiat Money
Wright, Randall - 1999
The simple search-theoretic model of fiat money has three symmetric Nash equilibria: all agents accept money with probability 1; all agents accept money with probability 0; and all agents accept money with probability y in (0,1). Here I construct an asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014184258
Cover Image
Observable strategies, commitments, and contracts
Wärneryd, Karl Erik - 2014
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent's rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010437999
Cover Image
Splitting games : Nash equilibrium and the optimisation problem
Martins, Ana Paula - 2010
This research states the stylised n (more than two) players' splitting problem as a mathematical programme, relying on definitions of the values of the game and problem stationarity to generate tractable reduced forms, and derives the known solutions according to the properties of pertaining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011524731
Cover Image
Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets
Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth - 2009
Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of indirect dominance, we investigate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013159464
Cover Image
Reference points, social norms, and fairness in contract renegotiations : conference paper
Bartling, Björn; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2013
-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant … threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to strategically equivalent bargaining situations … in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask for markups that are 45 percent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342843
Cover Image
Reference Points, Social Norms, and Fairness in Contract Renegotiations
Bartling, Björn - 2014
How does an ex ante contract affect behavior in an ex post renegotiation game? We address this question in a canonical … buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a … bargaining threat points. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to strategically equivalent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013065729
Cover Image
Observable Strategies, Commitments, and Contracts
Warneryd, Karl - 2021
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent’s rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315559