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We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent's rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010437999
It is well known that delegating the play of a game to an agent via incentive contracts may serve as a commitment device and hence provide a strategic advantage. Previous literature has shown that any Nash equilibrium outcome of an extensive-form principals-only game can be supported as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012001777
-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant … threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to strategically equivalent bargaining situations … in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask for markups that are 45 percent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342843
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent’s rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315559
It is well known that delegating the play of a game to an agent via incentive contracts may serve as a commitment device and hence provide a strategic advantage. Previous literature has shown that any Nash equilibrium outcome of an extensive-form principals-only game can be supported as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014216262
optimally offers a contract that makes the agent's utility concave in output. If the agent is risk-neutral and protected by … concavity constraint might bind for some outputs but not others. We characterize the unique profit-maximizing contract and show …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308620
conclude a family of ineffective contracts in the future and a (profitable) new contract in the present or (ii) in future, in … each given state of the world, contracts are broken partially and asymmetrically, after that a new contract is concluded … concluding a new contract in the present. Also, GEI-equilibrium is described as (ii) applied to all states of the world. This …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842642
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012672078
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011646493
This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587476