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We report the results of a combination of a dictator experiment with either a "social planner" or a "veil of ignorance …" experiment. The experimental design and the analysis of the data are based on the theoretical framework proposed in the companion … Agreement and Symmetry axioms proposed in BHH; we find that for 80% of participants the evidence is very strong. The experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010370990
We report the results of a combination of a dictator experiment with either a “social planner” or a “veil of ignorance …” experiment. The experimental design and the analysis of the data are based on the theoretical framework proposed in the companion … Agreement and Symmetry axioms proposed in BHH; we find that for 80% of participants the evidence is very strong. The experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010192931
We report the results of a combination of a dictator experiment with either a "social planner" or a "veil of ignorance …" experiment. The experimental design and the analysis of the data are based on the theoretical framework proposed in the companion … Agreement and Symmetry axioms proposed in BHH; we find that for 80% of participants the evidence is very strong. The experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013073251
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001321729
The St. Petersburg paradox is one of the oldest challenges of expected value theory. Thus far, explanations of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012029167
In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start off high and decline as the game is repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will self-select into groups committed to charitable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003850332
In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start of high and decline as the game is repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will selfselect into groups committed to charitable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003826571
In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start off high and decline as the game is repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will self-select into groups committed to charitable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013095928
Elicitation procedures (e.g., choice, valuation, matching, joint/separate evaluation) may generate reversed preferences between alternatives. Yet procedure-dependent preferences can be endogenous. When attribute importance is imperfectly known, people can engage in costly information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013314068
Recent theories of fairness (e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) have typically used the assumption of ex ante known pie size. Here I explore theoretically the ramifications of pie size being unknown ex ante. Using a simple allocation problem known as dictator game, I find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014066475