Riley (1979)'s reactive equilibrium concept addresses problems of equilibrium existence in competitive markets with adverse selection. The game-theoretic interpretation of the reactive equilibrium concept in Engers and Fernandez (1987) yields the Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976)/Riley (1979)...

Shows equilibrium always exists (Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson model) when firms enforce policy exclusivity via strategic (profit-maximizing) communication of client purchases. Strategic communication induces two equilibrium types: partial communication of purchase information or non-communication...

This paper investigates the effect of adverse selection on the private annuity market in a model with two periods of retirement and two types of individuals, who differ in their life expectancy. In order to introduce the existence of limited-time pension insurance, we consider a model where for...

This paper investigates the effect of adverse selection and price competition on the private annuity market in a model with two retirement periods. In this framework annuity companies can offer contracts with different payoffs over the periods of retirement. Varying the time structure of the...

This paper investigates the effect of adverse selection on the private annuity market in a model with two periods of retirement. In order to introduce the existence of limited-time pension insurance, we assume that for each period of retirement separate contracts can be purchased. Demand for the...

This paper investigates the effect of adverse selection on the private annuity market in a model with two periods of retirement. In order to introduce the existence of limited-time pension insurance, we assume that for each period of retirement separate contracts can be purchased. Demand for the...