We conduct one of the first laboratory experiments and noncooperative analyses of the de-centralized matching market … but some differ from experimental evidence. Stable matching, which coincides with efficient matching in this setting, is … core and whether efficient matching is assortative determine the rate of matching, efficient matching, and surplus achieved …

In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in … uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …

Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with … preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference …

empty, it contains a unique matching, the dominance invariant stable matching, in which all agents who mutually top rank …

characterize the existence of stable assignments in many-to-one matching problems with externalities. The set of stable matchings … bottom q-substitutability that guarantees the existence of at least one stable matching when the set of estimations includes …