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Time-neutrality and linearity

Lauwers, Luc - In: Journal of mathematical economics 24 (1995) 4, pp. 347-351

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001181612

Nash rationalization of collective choice over lotteries

Demuynck, Thomas; Lauwers, Luc - In: Mathematical social sciences 57 (2009) 1, pp. 1-15

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003797290

The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension

Kóczy, László Á.; Lauwers, Luc - In: Games and economic behavior 61 (2007) 2, pp. 277-298

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003581209

The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension

Kóczy, László Á.; Lauwers, Luc - 2004

A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating...