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We analyze takeover operations in which (i) bidding firms are risk-averse; (ii) offers can be made using cash or equity … acquirer initiates the takeover, and competitive operations, in which the target organizes an informal auction across potential …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014258241
We consider takeover bidding in a Cournot oligopoly when firms have private information concerning the synergy effect … of merging with a takeover target. Two auction rules are considered: standard first-price and profit-share auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822617
This paper uses a unified treatment of real options and game theory to examine value appropriation in takeovers within a competitive environment of imperfect information. The integrated model considers a potential target as a shared real option on a bundle of resources. Competing potential...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011337396
In this note I give a full characterization of all deterministic direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values that are dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337703
. The problem is deterministic and it is assumed that the takeover success probability is equal to 1. The model allows to … identify the range of costs that the bidder has to bear considering the restrictions imposed by the law on takeover bids. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013019335
We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information. In this context, we identify a class of direct and incentive compatible mechanisms: each principal privately recommends to each agent to reveal her private information to the other principals, and each agent behaves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014180095
In a competitive environment players often face uncertainty about the relative strength of their opponents. This paper considers a winner-take-all rent-seeking contest between two players with different costs of effort. Costs of effort are private knowledge, however, players have an opportunity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014215268
This paper explores how a seller should transmit product information to bidders with horizontally differentiated preferences. Under cheap-talk, we show that, in an informative equilibrium, the seller provides less precise information for more popular product attributes. Second, for any given...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013250400
We study games in which multiple principals influence the choice of a privately-informed agent by offering action-contingent payments. We characterize the equilibrium allocation set as the maximizers of an endogenous aggregate virtual-surplus program. The aggregate maximand for every equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013027479
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087801