We set up a sequential merger game to study a firm's incentives to pass up on an opportunity to merge with another firm …. We find that such incentives may exist when there are efficiency gains from a merger, firms are of different sizes, there …

still benefits from the increase in the merged firm's total value. Moreover, given that the managers are compensated … according to an identical linear incentive scheme, the optimal shareholder policy always entails a corner solution. Managers …

lens of effort incentives-risk premium trade-offs derived from classical principal-agent theory. In contrast, the recent … competitors to assess a firm’s strategic direction, and for investors to hold managers accountable for strategy execution …

A usual assumption in the theory of collusion is that cartels are all-inclusive. In contrast, most real-world collusive …, which firms are part of it. The second aim of the experiment is to study the coordinated effects of a merger when partial … after a merger. Our findings suggest that merger analysis that is based on the assumption that only full cartels forms …

horizontal/conglomerate merger games. A merger decreases the expected payoff of each merging agent if and only if the strategies … or too noisy information. Expected consumer and total welfare may increase after a horizontal/conglomerate merger or …