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the prevalence of their own values and preferences when forming beliefs about others' values and preferences, depends on … the salience of own preferences. We manipulate salience by varying the order of elicitation of preferences and beliefs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014233633
-group and out-group agents with the respective beliefs held by dictators and recipients in these groups. We observe both in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010529474
A simple expression is derived for the optimal strategy in the minimum effort game. This maps from player beliefs to an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891195
I develop a game theoretic model where players use two different reasoning processes in strategic situations: cooperative and competitive. Players always consider cooperating at first: if they believe others will cooperate with enough probability, they will do so; otherwise they behave...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012924120
We have used the standard trust game on a random sample of university students (N=764) and a random sample of rural residents (N=834) in Malawi. The study identifies social preference types (Bauer, Chytilov'a, & Pertold-Gebicka, 2014; Fehr, Gl¨atzle-R¨utzler, & Sutter, 2013) and how these relate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014427519
We study the interaction between competition and social proximity on altruism, trust, and reciprocity. We decompose the behavioral channels by utilizing variants of both the Trust Game and the Dictator Game in a design that systematically controls the transmission of relevant information. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138590
beliefs and to choose actions. Subjects saw each of 12 games four times in a regular or isomorphic form spread over two days … level-k theory, and show that stability of both beliefs and actions is significantly lower. Finally, we estimate a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107567
In this contribution, we investigate the effects of observation-only and observation with feedback from a third-party in a one-shot dictator game (DG). In addition to a baseline condition (DG), a third-party anonymous subject was introduced who either silently observed or observed and got to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117227
For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs … failed to explain their choices between corrupt and non-corrupt behavior. Instead, their beliefs appeared to be a better …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011051389
players realize that their own actions modify their opponent's beliefs and actions, they might play certain actions to this … their beliefs in order to take account of the reaction of their opponents to their own action. Second, we examine if players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696779