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Suicide terrorism and the backlash effect
Rosendorff, B. Peter; Sandler, Todd - In: Defence and peace economics 21 (2010) 5/6, pp. 443-457
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009010974
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Suicide intention and suicide prevention: an economic perspective
Yaniv, Gideon - In: The journal of socio-economics 30 (2001) 5, pp. 453-468
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001686459
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The scale of terrorist attacks as a signal of resources
Overgaard, Per Baltzer - 1993
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000877600
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Models of interdependent security along the milk supply chain
Nganje, William; Bier, Vicki M.; Han, Hoa; Zack, Lorna - In: American journal of agricultural economics 90 (2008) 5, pp. 1265-1271
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003783394
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Islamistischer Terrorismus : Analysen, Entwicklungen und Anti-Terrorpolitik aus der Sicht ökonomischer Forschung
Entorf, Horst - In: Terrorismus und Extremismus - der Zukunft auf der Spur …, (pp. 85-103). 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003325927
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Altruistic responses to the september 11 terrorist attacks : some evidence from dictator games
Kamas, Linda; Baum, Sandra R.; Preston, Anne E. - In: Eastern economic journal 31 (2005) 4, pp. 551-562
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003328319
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Foreign aid as counterterrorism policy
Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu; Sandler, Todd; Younas, Javed - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003831934
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Anti-terrorism politics and the risk of provoking
Dietrich, Franz - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003809029
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The past and future of terrorism research
Sandler, Todd - In: Revista de economía aplicada : publicación cuatrimestral 17 (2009) 50, pp. 5-25
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003891841
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The strategy of manipulating conflict
Baliga, Sandeep; Sjöström, Tomas - 2009
Two decision-makers choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. The decision-making can be manipulated by "extremists" who send publicly observed cheap-talk messages. The power of extremists depends on the nature of the underlying conflict game. If actions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003894773