workers regularly overstate their own contribution to the joint team output. Misreporting seems to spread distrust within the … team of workers, as well as between managers and workers. This manifests itself in managers being less generous with … workers' actual contributions to the team output is beneficial for the success of gift-exchange relationships. Yet, workers …

choose between (low-powered) team incentives and (high-powered) individual incentives. We observe that subjects exhibiting … high trust or reciprocity in the trust game are more likely to choose team incentives. When exposed to individual … incentives, workers who chose team incentives perform worse if both the unobservable interdependency between workers and their …

choose between (low-powered) team incentives and (high-powered) individual incentives. We observe that subjects exhibiting … high trust or reciprocity in the trust game are more likely to choose team incentives. When exposed to individual … incentives, workers who chose team incentives perform worse if both the unobservable interdependency between workers and their …

Modern 'principal-agent theory' has made a lot of progress in proposing theoretical Solutions to agency problems. This … evidence on offered contracts and effort choices in a simple agency game. In line with principal-agent theory we find that in … design has to regard an equity constraint that has so far been neglected by contract theory. In fact, most contract offers …