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The social value of transparency and accountability : experimental evidence from asymmetric public good games ; conference paper
Khadjavi, Menusch; Lange, Andreas; Nicklisch, Andreas - 2014
backfires as special agents extract significantly more resources. Introducing a peer punishment mechanism sustains contributions … stigmatization effect for the special agent as he receives substantially more peer punishment while contributions by other agents do … not change. Finally full transparency of all agents actions creates full accountability as it allows targeted punishment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487735
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The demand for punishment to promote cooperation among like-minded people
Bühren, Christoph; Dannenberg, Astrid - 2020
We use an experiment to test the hypothesis that groups consisting of like-minded cooperators are able to cooperate … irrespective of punishment and therefore have a lower demand for a costly punishment institution than groups of like-minded free … riders, who are unable to cooperate without punishment. We also predict that the difference in the demand for punishment is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012542999
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The demand for punishment to promote cooperation among like-minded people
Bühren, Christoph; Dannenberg, Astrid - 2021
We use an experiment to test the hypothesis that groups consisting of like-minded cooperators are able to cooperate … irrespective of punishment and therefore have a lower demand for a costly punishment institution than groups of like-minded free … riders, who are unable to cooperate without punishment. We also predict that the difference in the demand for punishment is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013337734
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Letting off steam! : experimental evidence on inappropriate punishment
Khachatryan, Elina; Bühren, Christoph - 2020
force of punishment, yet when treated fairly, some subjects (17%) exhibit status-seeking behavior. Moreover, students …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012542938
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The Effect of Social Information in the Dictator Game with a Taking Option
O'Garra, Tanya - 2019
We experimentally study how redistribution choices are affected by positive and negative information regarding the behaviour of a previous participant in a dictator game with a taking option. We use the strategy method to identify behavioural ‘types', and thus distinguish ‘conformists' from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012865728
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Discretionary sanctions and rewards in the repeated inspection game
Nosenzo, Daniele; Offerman, Theo; Sefton, Martin; Veen, … - 2014 - This version: 02 April 2014
We experimentally investigate a repeated "inspection game" where, in the stage game, an employee can either work or shirk and an employer simultaneously chooses to inspect or not inspect. The unique equilibrium of the stage game is in mixed strategies with positive probabilities of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340303
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Discretionary sanctions and rewards in the repeated inspection game
Nosenzo, Daniele; Offerman, Theo; Sefton, Martin; Veen, … - 2012
We experimentally investigate a repeated "inspection game" where, in the stage game, an employee can either work or shirk and an employer simultaneously chooses to inspect or not inspect. Combined payoffs are maximized when the employee works and the employer does not inspect. However, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578200
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The behavioral impact of emotions in a power to take game : an experimental study
Bosman, Ronald; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 1999
-making experiment preceding the take game. The gameconsists of two stages. In the first stage, the take authority decides howmuch income … punishment behavior. (3) Thereare discontinuous "jumps" in the behavior of responders. They either chooseno punishment (destroy … nothing) or the highest level of punishment (destroyeverything). (4) Expectations have a significant effect on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301155
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An experiment on cooperation in a CPR game with a disapproval option
Yao, Koffi Serge William - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-14
, the extent to which the Nash threat leads to Pareto-improving extraction levels. Through our experiment, we confirm the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012650460
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An experiment on the Nash program : comparing two strategic mechanisms implementing the shapley value
Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric; … - 2022
We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand-basedWinter's demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013252966