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Deterrence of financial misreporting when public and private enforcement strategically interact

Schantl, Stefan F.; Wagenhofer, Alfred - In: Journal of accounting & economics 70 (2020) 1, pp. 1-24

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012301651

Adversarial bias, litigation, and the Daubert test : an economic approach

Kim, Chulyoung - In: International review of law and economics 47 (2016), pp. 67-75

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011626804

Judge's gate-keeping power and deterrence of negligent acts : an economic analysis of Twombly and Iqbal

Kim, Chulyoung - In: European journal of law and economics 46 (2018) 1, pp. 39-66

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012029297

Expert opinion in a tort litigation game

Oytana, Yves; Chappe, Nathalie - In: European journal of law and economics 46 (2018) 1, pp. 67-107

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012029299

Expert opinion in a tort litigation game

Oytana, Yves; Chappe, Nathalie - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011737181

A description-experience gap in social interactions : information about interdependence and its effects on cooperation

Martin, Jolie M.; Gonzalez, Cleotilde; Juvina, Ion; … - In: Journal of behavioral decision making 27 (2014) 4, pp. 349-362

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010517804

The behavioral impact of emotions in a power to take game : an experimental study

Bosman, Ronald; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 1999

punishment behavior. (3) Thereare discontinuous "jumps" in the behavior of responders. They either chooseno punishment (destroy … nothing) or the highest level of punishment (destroyeverything). (4) Expectations have a significant effect on the … probabilityof punishment but not on the intensity of experienced emotion. We explainthis last result in terms of norm …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301155

Reputation transmission without benefit to the reporter : a behavioral underpinning of markets in experimental focus

Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis G. - 2015 - This version: September 8, 2015

Reputation is a commonly cited check on opportunism in economic and social interactions. But it is often unclear what would motivate an agent to report another’s behavior when the pool of potential partners is large and it is easy enough for an aggrieved player to move on. We argue that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333021

Punishment, cooperation, and cheater detection in "noisy" social exchange

Bornstein, Gary; Weisel, Ori - In: Games 1 (2010) 1, pp. 18-33

information conditions, where cheating is less obvious, punishment is much less effective in enforcing cooperation. Evidently, the … explanatory power of punishment is constrained by the visibility of cheating. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751389

Human pro-social motivation and the maintenance of social order

Gächter, Simon - 2014

inclinations. The third pillar are sanctions meted out to anyone who does not cooperate; ideally punishment can work as a mere … findings, in particular with regard to punishment behaviour. The chapter concludes with remarks on future research. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010257224

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