This paper presents a model which focuses on differences between the competition policy of the EU and antitrust of the U.S. It introduces three versions - Neutral, American, and European. Two-stage game model takes the authority’s perspective and describes options and behavior of antitrust...

Bernheim and Whinston (1986) show that, in a common agency problem without budget constraints, the set of Nash equilibria with truthful strategies (TNE), the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria (CPNE), and the principal-optimal core of the underlying coalitional game exist and are all...

This paper investigates gender differences in donating behavior in double-anonymous dictator game experiments. To do so, we developed a new treatment where researchers can connect the gender of a dictator to her/his donation amount despite both female and male dictators being gathered in a room...

In an experts-assisted decision making paradigm, the information collection design becomes a strategic variable under a weak assumption that the final decision is dependent on the design used to collect information as well. As a result, the same information of the experts and the decision maker...

The issue of the stability and change of legal rules occupies a central place in the discussions of alternative ways of organizing justice and the provision of legal rules. There nonetheless remains a theoretical aspect that has never been raised in the literature on judicial decision making and...

Does the cultural background influence the success with which genetically unrelated individuals cooperate in social dilemma situations? In this paper we provide an answer by analyzing the data of Herrmann et al. (Science 2008, pp. 1362-1367), who study cooperation and punishment in sixteen...

Many conflicts in numerous parts of the developing world can be traced to disputes over land ownership, land use and land degradation. In this paper we test the hypothesis that differences in knowledge structures on land tenure and market systems between different leaders within these countries...

Does the cultural background influence the success with which genetically unrelated individuals cooperate in social dilemma situations? In this paper we provide an answer by analyzing the data of Herrmann et al. (Science 2008, pp. 1362-1367), who study cooperation and punishment in sixteen...

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. We consider contribution and subscription games. We show that every equilibrium is inefficient. We also provide a sufficient condition for 'contributing zero' to be the unique equilibrium...

Two groups produce a network good perceived by a third party, such as a police or military institution, as a "public bad", referred to as "crime" for simplicity. These two groups, considered mafias, are assumed to be antagonists, whether they are enemies or competitors in the same market,...