Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures (BEIC) analyzes games with players forming their conjectures of what other players will do iteratively starting with first order uninformative conjectures (or prior distribution functions) and updating their conjectures iteratively with game...

This paper proposes a way to solve two (and multiple) sided incomplete information games which generally generates a unique equilibrium. The approach uses iterative conjectures updated by game theoretic and Bayesian statistical decision theoretic reasoning. Players in the games form conjectures...

Rent seeking contest shapes the risk preference of the contestants. It instills in the weaker contestant who has little to lose and much to gain a preference for risk taking, and the weaker the contestant, the stronger the instilled preference for risk taking. On the other hand, it causes the...

This article proposes using Schelling point as a refinement of Nash equilibrium. It also introduces an algorithm way to locate Schelling points in games. The paper shows that in pure coordination games and games with significant proportion of coordination (and certain proportion of conflict),...

This paper introduces a new game theoretic equilibrium, Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures (BEIC). It requires agents to make predictions, starting from first order uninformative predictive distribution functions (or conjectures) and keep updating with statistical decision theoretic...

Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is not a subset of Nash equilibrium. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium requires players to have beliefs that are consistent with the equilibrium strategies of other players. Nash equilibrium does not explicitly specify the beliefs of the players. However, the default...

This paper uses Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures approach to solve a noisy sequential game, that is, a sequential game with inaccurate observation clouded by noise. Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures requires players to form conjectures about the strategies of the other...

This paper proposes a way to solve two sided incomplete information games which generally generates a unique equilibrium. Players in the games form conjectures about what other players want to do, starting from first order uninformative conjectures and keep updating with games theoretic and...