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regime changes are often followed by redistribution to the poor at the expense of the former elite. We argue that the reason … why the elite may have to resort to full-scale democratization, despite its apparent costs to themselves, may be that …Regimes controlled by a rich elite often collapse and make way for democracy amidst widespread social unrest. Such …
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In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011600156
This is a game-theoretic analysis of the link between regime type and international conflict. The democratic electorate can credibly punish the leader for bad conflict outcomes, whereas the autocratic selectorate cannot. For the fear of being thrown out of office, democratic leaders are (i )...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003723925
By incorporating positional dynamics into a conflict model relevant to battlefields and politics, we show that the conditions that induce regime stability can also induce hard conflicts. We show that in contests with incumbent-challenger turnover, i) asymmetric power across groups and positions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011585145
the reasons for being poor. We develop and test a theo-ry about support for redistribution in the presence of target …-specific beliefs about the causes of low and high incomes. Our theory predicts that target-specific beliefs about the poor matter most … welfare recipients supports our theory. We also find, in theory, the ex-istence of a moral release equilibrium in which the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011993478
changes in wealth distribution, and c) the size of the ruling class, “elite”. In the conflict stage, institutional quality … positively depends on the wealth of the elite, but negatively – on the size of the elite class. However, the transition from … institutional trap. Moreover, the intensity of rent-seeking behavior increases both with progressive redistribution of wealth and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013043892
Experiments evaluate the fit of human behaviour to the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI), a formula of voter power. Groups of six subjects with differing votes divide a fixed purse by majority rule in online chat rooms. Earnings proxy for measured power. Chat rooms and processes for selecting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009789971