has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of … the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … satiable agents, i.e., the benefit function is decreasing beyond some satiation point. In such situations externalities appear …

We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identitydependent externalities. A concept of conjectural …

In auctions with externalities, it is well-known that the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of … the sense that the seller and the bidders experience justified envy. We show that the core is nonempty if bidders cannot …

This paper studies an extensive form game of coalition formation with random proposers in games with externalities. It … the absence of externalities, and symmetric players are not necessarily treated symmetrically in equilibrium. If the grand … coalition forms without delay in equilibrium, expected payoffs must be in the core of the characteristic function game that …

continue to negotiate as long as there are gains from trade, and coalitions may create positive or negative externalities. The … theory yields a unique stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome - the coalitional bargaining value-that has an …

We generalise the coalition structure core to partition function games. Our definition relies only on one crucial … initial one, and – whenever this is possible – they come to a residual core outcome. Deviating players form their optimistic … or pessimistic expectations with this in mind. This leads to a recursive definition of the core. When compared to …

"externalities", the description of which requires partition function form (PFF) games. In this paper we propose a method to compute … mechanism to determine gas flows and transport fees for individual players and uses the recursive core and the minimal claim …

general games. As a direct translation of the balanced cost reduction property, the axiom of balanced externalities for … possible to the idea behind balanced externalities, we weaken this axiom by requiring that every player's payoff is the same … fraction of its total externality inflicted on the other players. This weakening, which we call weak balanced externalities …

In the absence of externalities, marginality is equivalent to an independence property that rests on Harsanyi … and independence for games with externalities. We measure a player‘s contribution in an embedded coalition by the change …. The introduced method also allows us to investigate egalitarian solutions and to reveal how accounting for externalities …