horizontal/conglomerate merger games. A merger decreases the expected payoff of each merging agent if and only if the strategies … or too noisy information. Expected consumer and total welfare may increase after a horizontal/conglomerate merger or …

We analyze a Bayesian merger game under two-sided asymmetric information about firm types. We show that the standard … prediction of the lemons market model–if any, only low-type firms are traded–is likely to be misleading: Merger returns, i.e. the … difference between pre- and post-merger profits, are not necessarily higher for low-type firms. This has two implications. First …

We examine takeover auctions when an informed bidder has better informationabout the target value than a rival and …

We consider takeover bidding in a Cournot oligopoly when firms have private information concerning the synergy effect … of merging with a takeover target. Two auction rules are considered: standard first-price and profit-share auctions …, supplemented by entry fees. Since non-merged firms benefit from a merger if the synergies are low, bidders are subject to a …