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Central bank's retained profits and discount windows : a bureaucratic organization's discretion-seeking hypothesis
Kim, Il-joong; Kim, Inbae - In: Emerging markets finance & trade : a journal of the … 49 (2013) 3, pp. 84-102
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010200842
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The impact of fiscal-monetary policy interactions on government size and macroeconomic performance
Cuciniello, Vincenzo - In: Economic modelling 26 (2009) 5, pp. 918-925
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003871227
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Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in a cash-in-advance growing economy
Sujjapongse, Somchai - 1990
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000847551
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The Impact of Fiscal-Monetary Policy Interactions on Government Size and Macroeconomic Performance
Cuciniello, Vincenzo - 2009
This paper analyzes the relationship between inflation, output and government size by reexamining the time inconsistency of optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a general equilibrium model with staggered timing structure for the acquisition of nominal money à la Neiss (Neiss, Katharine S....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013155844
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Political geography
Prescott, John R. V. - 1972 - 1. publ.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013489087
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Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions : When Are Independent Central Banks Irrelevant?
Keefer, Philip - 1999
reports new theory and tests related to delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank. The authors find that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010524515
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Un modèle de comportement bureaucratique de la banque centrale : le cas de la BCEAO
N'Guessan, Tchétché - In: Revue économique : revue bimestrielle 42 (1991) 5, pp. 901-915
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001111319
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Discretion Rather than Rules : Choice of Instruments to Control Bureaucratic Policy Making
Gailmard, Sean - 2010
In this paper I investigate the trade-off a legislature faces in the choice of instruments to ensure accountability by bureaucrats with private information. The legislature can either design a state-contingent incentive scheme or “menu law” to elicit the bureau's information or it can simply...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013151463
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Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions : When are Independent Central Banks Irrelevant?
Keefer, Philip; Stasavage, David - 2004
theory and tests related to delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank. The authors find that delegation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014130509
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Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy
Toma, Eugenia Froedge - 1986
the Problems of Control -- 6. The Choice of Monetary Instruments and the Theory of Bureaucracy -- 7. Bureaucratic Theory … Financing and Bureaucratic Rents -- 2. Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice -- 3. Inflationary Bias of the Federal Reserve … not tried to present a theory of why the Fed behaves the way it does. The dominant theory of Fed behavior is that the Fed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013519820