We develop a dynamic two-period generalized beauty contest to study the optimal level of publicity when disclosed information is subject to multiplier effects inherent to social learning. We build upon the static case, where all agents receive a private signal about an unknown fundamental state...

We develop a dynamic two-period generalized beauty contest to study the optimal level of publicity when disclosed information is subject to multipliereffects inherent to social learning. We build upon the static case, where all agents receive a private signal about an unknown fundamental state...

We study the general problem of information design for a policymaker—a central bank—that communicates its private information (the ``state") to the public. We show that it is optimal for the policymaker to partition the state space into a finite number of ``clusters” and to communicate to...

This paper considers a central puzzle of central bank independence: why politicians would agree to establish such a bank, when the consequence is giving up a substantial degree of control over the money supply and price levels. I suggest that politicians agree to establish independent central...