Showing 1 - 10 of 22,512
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003676552
System). In the second part, we present a theory of central bank accountability. Two aspects of accountability are considered … Japan, Bank of England und Federal Reserve System). Im zweiten Teil stellen wir eine Theorie über die Rechenschaftspflicht …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011418852
What are the welfare effects of enhanced disclosures of public information - Is it always the case, that frequent and timely publication of economic statistics by government agencies and the central bank are desirable - This question has become one of several interlinked strands of debate on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011418868
We examine whether it is socially beneficial for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be published when the general public is unsure about central bankers' efficiency and central bankers are aiming for re-election. We show that publication is initially harmful since...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011419080
This paper examines whether it is socially desirable for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be published when central bankers' preferences differ. We show that the misrepresentation of their preferences is not advantageous for central bankers although central...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011419124
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002388984
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001705559
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001692566
We examine whether it is socially beneficial for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be published when the general public is unsure about central bankers' efficiency and central bankers are aiming for re-election. We show that publication is initially harmful since...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001558063
This paper examines whether it is socially desirable for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be published when central bankers' ; preferences differ. We show that the misrepresentation of their preferences is not advantageous for central bankers although central...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001558069