Financial markets and macroeconomic environments are often characterized by positive externalities. In these environments, transparency may reduce expected welfare from an ex-ante point of view: public announcements serve as a focal point for higher-order beliefs and affect agents' behaviour...

The literature on central banking so far has provided explanations of why we observe independent central banks and why central banks are usually more conservative than governments. However, little is known about the interaction between the two institutions. Bridging the gap, we focus on the...

We develop a DSGE model with firm-specific labor where firm-level wage bargaining and price setting are subject to Calvo-type staggering. This is in general an intractable problem due to complicated intertemporal dependencies between price and wage decisions. However, the problem is...

We examine multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfer in the framework of Crawford and Sobel (1982). In our model, an informed expert can send messages to an uninformed decision maker more than once, and the uninformed decision maker can pay money to the informed expert...

This paper analyzes the optimal monetary policy in a model with a public sector when firms choose prices under incomplete information, and the government can not observe the current state perfectly. We accommodate the notion of Odyssean forward guidance in a framework with a public sector. The...

Using sector-level survey data for the universe of Japanese firms, we establish the positive co-movement in the firm’s expectations about aggregate and sector-specific demand shocks. We show that a simple model with imperfect information on the current aggregate and sector-specific components...