We develop a dynamic two-period generalized beauty contest to study the optimal level of publicity when disclosed information is subject to multiplier effects inherent to social learning. We build upon the static case, where all agents receive a private signal about an unknown fundamental state...

We develop a dynamic two-period generalized beauty contest to study the optimal level of publicity when disclosed information is subject to multipliereffects inherent to social learning. We build upon the static case, where all agents receive a private signal about an unknown fundamental state...

This paper shows that belief‐driven economic fluctuations are a general feature of many determinate macroeconomic models. In environments with hidden state variables, forecast‐model misspecification can break the link between indeterminacy and sunspots by establishing the existence of...

We study the general problem of information design for a policymaker—a central bank—that communicates its private information (the ``state") to the public. We show that it is optimal for the policymaker to partition the state space into a finite number of ``clusters” and to communicate to...

Despite a large literature documenting that the efficacy of monetary policy depends on how inflation expectations are anchored, many monetary policy models assume: (1) the inflation target of monetary policy is constant; and, (2) the inflation target is known by all economic agents. This paper...

Central bank communication plays an important role in shaping market participants’ expectations. This paper studies a simple nonlinear model of monetary policy in which agents have incomplete information about the economic environment. It shows that agents’ learning and the dynamics of the...

We derive the optimal monetary policy in a sticky price model when private agents follow adaptive learning. We show that this slight departure from rationality has important implications for policy design. The central bank faces a new intertemporal trade-off, not present under rational...

Survey data on inflation expectations show that: (i) private sector forecasts and central bank forecasts are not fully aligned and (ii) private sector forecasters disagree about inflation expectations. To reconcile these two facts we introduce dispersed information in a New Keynesian model,...