We study optimal monetary policy in an environment in which firms' pricing and production decisions are subject to informational frictions. Our framework accommodates multiple formalizations of these frictions, including dispersed private information, sticky information, and certain forms of...

This paper analyzes the optimal monetary policy in a model with a public sector when firms choose prices under incomplete information, and the government can not observe the current state perfectly. We accommodate the notion of Odyssean forward guidance in a framework with a public sector. The...

This Paper, which extends earlier work by Filardo and Guinigundo (2008) and Nelson (2008), reports on a survey conducted in 2007 on the communication practices of 32 members of the Central Bank Governance Network. The questionnaire sent to Network members was divided into two main parts. The...

It is argued in literature that transparency may be detrimental to welfare. Morris and Shin (2002) suggest reducing the precision of public information or withholding it. The latter seems to be unrealistic. Thus, the issue is not whether central bank should disclose or not its information, but...

Repeated contracting allows lenders to uncover private information about their clients, decreasing the informational asymmetry between a borrower and his lender but introducing one between the lender and competing financiers. This paper constructs a credit-based model of production to analyze...

This paper theoretically investigates inflation targeting when there is asymmetric information between the Central Bank and the public. The main argument of this study is that the inflation target can be used as a signalling mechanism through which the private-sector learns about the private...

I study the optimal type of forward guidance in a flexible-price economy in which both the private sector and the central bank are subject to imperfect information about the aggregate state of the economy. In this case, forward guidance changes the private sector's expectations about both future...

This paper studies monetary policy under discretion when the central bank ex ante determines information to be acquired and made public. In a general setting, wherein a monetary instrument signals the central bank's private information, I show that an optimal information policy comprises the...

Inflation targeting is strictly suboptimal when economic actors have incomplete information about the state of the economy. Nominal income targeting is approximately optimal, and exactly optimal under certain parameterizations. We derive this result in a “Lucas islands” monetary...

We develop a dynamic, search-theoretic model of bank deposit and loan markets where relationships are bilateral, the demand for liquid assets is microfounded, and consumers are privately informed about their liquidity needs. As the policy rate rises, the deposit spread widens, and aggregate...