This paper identifies zero lower bound risk as key rationale for a monetary policymaker to actively manage the size and composition of its holdings of domestic debt. This is true at all times, including when the zero lower bound does not currently bind. It then provides a simple, optimal rule...

FocusThe paper examines the relationship between monetary policy and market prices through the lens of central bank communication. Central bankers use forward guidance to steer market expectations of future monetary policy moves. At the same time, they rely on market prices to gauge the likely...

Has the Federal Open Market Committee's policy rule changed in recent years? This is difficult to answer given the zero lower bound environment for the federal funds rate throughout late 2008 to 2015. This paper addresses the problem using policymakers' projections for the near horizon from 2012...

US Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) projections for the federal funds rate are inherently subject to revision with the availability of new data. But when issued jointly with projections for macroeconomic aggregates, they also contain conditional information about the intended future policy...

We explore a global game model of the impact of monetary policy shocks. Risk-neutral asset managers interact with risk-averse households in a market with a risky bond and a floating rate money market fund. Asset managers are averse to coming last in the ranking of short-term performance. This...

Recent trends toward greater central bank independence and the adoption of formal inflation targeting by several countries have served to emphasise the importance of communication policy. In this paper, we explore some of the economic effects of public information that arise whenever public...

One role of monetary policy is to coordinate expectations in the economy and greater transparency of monetary policy may lead to greater coordination. But if transparent monetary policy helps coordinate expectations, then it must also magnify mistakes