This paper argues that the loose monetary policy of two of the world’s most important financial institutions-the US Federal Reserve Board and the European Central Bank-were ultimately responsible for the outburst of global financial crisis of 2008 - 09. Unusually low interest rates in 2001 -...

We evaluate the effects of permanently reducing labour tax rates in the euro area (EA) by simulating a large-scale open economy dynamic general equilibrium model. The model features the EA as a monetary union, split in two regions (Home and the rest of the EA - REA), the US, and the rest of the...

This paper analyses the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic shock on small open economies in a monetary union with an application to the euro area. Accounting for a high degree of openness and a strong dependence on intra and extra union trade, we focus on the size and the direction of...

When a monetary union member (a small open economy) borrows and lends with other union members and only has access to conventional debt instruments, its optimal fiscal police is time inconsistent because its governments are short of policy instruments to render optimal fiscal policy time...

Less economic integration would make it difficult for the ECB to stabilise the euro area economies. Symmetric monetary policy cannot do anything about this and individual countries would need to use fiscal policy tools

So far, the "new open economy macroeconomics" literature has primarily focused on monetary policy and monetary policy rules, rather than paying attention also to fiscal policy. This is an omission because, especially with the advent of EMU, the burden on fiscal policy as an instrument for...

In light of persistent in ation dispersion and rising debt levels in the EMU, this paper investigates the welfare implications of budget-neutral scal policies that counteract in ation di erentials. In a two-country DSGE model of a monetary union with traded and non-traded goods a national scal...

We analyze fiscal rules within a Monetary Union in the presence of (i) asymmetric information about member states' potential output and, therefore, output gap and (ii) bail-out among member states. In our framework, bail-out lowers the scope for signalling (discrimination) by member states...

We analyze fiscal rules within a Monetary Union in the presence of (i) asymmetric information on member states' potential output and (ii) bail-out among member states. The first-best deficit is contingent on the cycle, that is, on member states' output gap. In the presence of asymmetric...

We use a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union to study the impacts of an exogenous fall in aggregate demand, the resulting increase in public debt, and the consequences of a sovereign debt haircut for a member country or bloc of the union. In this union, the governments of...