In this paper, we propose to compare different partial transparency regimes in order to determine the optimal diessemination policy by the central bank, using an experimental approach. A treatment dedicated to the benchmark situation (where information is fully released) is also available. Our...

How much information should a central bank (CB) have about (i) policy objectives and (ii) operational shocks to the effect of monetary policy? We consider a version of the Barro–Gordon credibility problem in which monetary policy signals an inflation-biased CB's private information on both...

Consider a competitive bank whose illiquid asset portfolio is funded by short-term debt that has to be refinanced before the asset matures. We show that in this setting maximal transparency is not socially optimal, and that the existence of social externalities of bank failures further lowers...

Using unique data that track the Federal Reserve's direct access of SEC filings, we provide evidence that accounting disclosures are associated with the Fed's economic forecasts and, by extension, its monetary policy. We find that the Fed's access of SEC filings reflects economic trends as well...

Professor Friedman restates his three reasons for adding credit to the list of intermediate targets for monetary policy: (1) policymakers should broaden their sources of information to include observations on both the asset and liability sides of the public's balance sheet; (2) the domestic...