Using a promotion signaling model in which wages are realistically shaped by market forces, we analyze how male … overconfident workers exert more effort to be promoted, which translates into a higher probability of promotion and superior wage … growth. Interestingly, workers who are not overconfident have higher expected ability conditional on promotion than …

vehicle of analysis is a promotion-signaling model in which wages are realistically determined by market forces. We find that … overconfident workers exert more effort to be promoted, and even though they have lower expected ability conditional on promotion …

acceptance as well as promotion. We focus on a selfdirected measure of productivity: working paper output. This avoids potential … departments, and that authors with more working papers get promoted at higher rates. We do not find any differences in promotion …

acceptance as well as promotion. We focus on a selfdirected measure of productivity: working paper output. This avoids potential … departments, and that authors with more working papers get promoted at higher rates. We do not find any differences in promotion …