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Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium
Dubey, Pradeep K.; Geanakoplos, John; Shubik, Martin - 2004
and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling … equilibrium always exists in our model, and that default, in conjunction with refinement, opens the door to a theory of endogenous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014070241
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Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium
Dubey, Pradeep K.; Geanakoplos, John; Shubik, Martin - 2004
and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling … equilibrium always exists in our model, and that default, in conjunction with refinement, opens the door to a theory of endogenous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014074211
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Liquidity, Default and Crashes : Endogenous Contracts in General Equilibrium
Geanakoplos, John - 2003
subsequently materialize. Introducing default and limited collateral into general equilibrium theory (GE) allows for a theory of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014125051
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Competitive Pooling : Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered
Dubey, Pradeep K.; Geanakoplos, John - 2003
We build a model of competitive pooling, which incorporates adverse selection and signalling into general equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014121720
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Default and punishment in general equilibrium
Dubey, Pradeep; Geanakoplos, John; Shubik, Martin - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 73 (2005) 1, pp. 1-37
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002567780
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Default and punishment in general equilibrium
Dubey, Pradeep; Geanakoplos, John; Shubik, Martin - 2003 - [Rev.]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001845225
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Default and punishment in general equilibrium
Dubey, Pradeep; Geanakoplos, John; Shubik, Martin - 2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001584189
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Moral Hazard and Efficiency in General Equilibrium with Anonymous Trading
Acemoglu, Daron - 2010
A "folk theorem" originating, among others, in the work of Stiglitz maintains that competitive equilibria area always or "generically" inefficient (unless contracts directly specify consumption levels as in Prescott and Townsend, thus bypassing trading in anonymous markets). This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013144184
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Occupational Choice and Dynamic Incentives
Ghatak, Maitreesh; Morelli, Massimo; Sjöström, Tomas - 2001
We study an overlapping generations version of the principal-agent problem, where incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium. All individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Imperfections in the credit market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014135339
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Occupational Choice and Dynamic Incentives
Ghatak, Maitreesh; Morelli, Massimo; Sjöström, Tomas - 2001
We study an overlapping generations version of the principal-agent problem, where incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium. All individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Imperfections in the credit market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014147066