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This article surveys the theoretical literature on legislative bargaining with endogenous status-quo. These are the legislative bargaining situations in which in each period a new policy is decided and the policy implemented in the event of no agreement is endogenously determined by the outcome...
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We develop a dynamic model of strategic investment in a transnational pipeline system. In the absence of international contract enforcement, countries may distort investment in order to increase their bargaining power, resulting in overinvestment in expensive and underinvestment in cheap...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271079
We conduct 3-person bargaining experiments in which the surplus being divided is produced by completing a prior task. Using a Baron-Ferejohn framework, we investigate how differences in contributions to production affect bargaining under different decision rules. Under unanimity rule, all...
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In a paper delivered at the December 1955 meeting of the Econometric Society, Paul Samuelson noted that though economists had done "work of high quality and great quantity in the field of taxation," the theory of public expenditure had been "relatively neglected" (1958, 332). Anglo-American...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013411358
We use a simple balanced budget contest to collect taxes on a private good in order to finance a pure public good. We show that-with an appropriately chosen structure of winning probabilities-this contest can provide the public good efficiently and without distorting private consumption. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008936379
We extend the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model of multilateral bargaining by allowing the players to attempt commiting to a bargaining position prior to negotiating. If successful, commitment binds a player to reject any proposal which allocates to her a share below a self-imposed threshold. Any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012176463
We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic pre-commitment. Prior to each bargaining round, players can declare a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014578010