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Performance measurement and evaluation systems are among the most common management instruments. An integral element of this process is the use of targets, typically set in appraisal interviews and formalized via written target agreements. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012231408
Many experiments indicate that most individuals are not purely motivated by material self interest, but also care about the well being of others. In this paper we examine tournaments among inequity averse agents, who dislike disadvantageous inequity (envy) and advantageous inequity (compassion)....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262248
Many experiments indicate that most individuals are not purely motivated by material self interest, but also care about the well being of others. In this paper we examine tournaments among inequity averse agents, who dislike disadvantageous inequity (envy) and advantageous inequity (compassion)....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263076
We provide an explanation for peer pressure in teams based on inequity aversion. Analyzing a two-period model with two agents, we find that the effect of inequity aversion strongly depends on the information structure. When contributions are unobservable, agents act as if they were purely...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268881
We provide an explanation for peer pressure in teams based on inequity aversion. Analyzing a two-period model with two agents, we find that the effect of inequity aversion strongly depends on the information structure. When contributions are unobservable, agents act as if they were purely...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003652683
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003765772
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003761542
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011447865
The impact of transparency on the extent of reciprocal behavior is investigated in a simple repeated gift exchange experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals? payoffs are determined by a random component. It is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261601
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