Using a unique experimental data set, we investigate how asymmetric legal rights shape bargainers’ aspiration levels through moral entitlements derived from equity norms and number prominence. Aspiration formation is typically hard to observe in real life. Our study involves 15 negotiations...

This paper considers the e effcts of a two-period interaction on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Compared to the (repeated) one-period case, the agent's first period actions may also signal his type which in turn impacts wages...

In this paper we make use of a unique dataset collected in the central train station of Kiel, Germany. A group ticket is used by individual proposers who search for co-travelers to share the ride with shortly before the train departure. The bargaining behavior resembles the Ultimatum game to the...

The effects of the three-point rule in first league German soccer are tested empirically and compared to games from the German cup-competition. The inclusion of cup games ensures that changes in league games can be attributed to the three-point rule. As a result of their relative devaluation,...

The effects of the three-point rule in first league German soccer are tested empirically and compared to games from the German cup-competition. The inclusion of cup games ensures that changes in league games can be attributed to the three-point rule. As a result of their relative devaluation,...

This paper analyzes the impact of FORIS contracts on litigation and settlement decisions using a simple divergent-expectations model. A FORIS contract introduces contingent fee arrangements under the British legal cost allocation rule: the plaintiff pays a percentage of his settlement or trial...