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Ein Instrument zur Eindämmung von Moral Hazard in der Arbeitslosenversicherung ist die finanzielle Sanktion in Form … Vermittlungsvorschlägen und Sperrzeiten auf die Dauer der Arbeitslosigkeit und die Qualität der aufgenommenen Jobs.Wir schätzen Multi … auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Krankmeldung. Dieser Effekt ist geringer in späteren Monaten der Arbeitslosigkeit. Dies …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011418245
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011449662
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011414725
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011635521
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000204
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013001341
This paper estimates the causal effect of long-term unemployment on wages. Job search theory implies that if Unemployment Insurance (UI) extensions do not affect wages conditional on the month of unemployment exit, then reservation wages do not bind on average. Then, UI extensions affect mean...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010457891
In 2005, the unemployment compensation for long-term unemployed was reduced in Germany. We examine how this reform affected the transition probability to employment. Additionally, we inspect how this effect varies over unemployment duration. We estimate proportional hazard models using German...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010344637
We empirically investigate how two-tier unemployment compensation schemes affect the profile of re-employment hazards. We exploit the aggravation of an existing two-tier scheme in Germany in 2005 and estimate its impact on re-employment rates at different durations. For the short-term...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011557930
This paper studies the impact of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration for East Germany using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. It concentrates on exit from unemployment into employment. Estimation results of a discrete-time hazard rate model imply that moderate cuts in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002623651