We examine the benefits of objective performance measurement in a field experiment conducted in a retail bank. At the outset objective performance measures of pro fits in each branch were only available on the branch level and managers allocated bonuses to their employees based on subjective...

We derive the optimal contract between a principal and a liquidity-constrained agent in a stochastically repeated environment. The contract comprises a court-enforceable explicit bonus rule and an implicit fixed salary promise that must be self-enforcing. Since the agent's rent increases with...

In der Empirie zeichnet sich ein Trend zu häufigerem Wechsel der Arbeitgeber und Projektarbeit ab. Gleichzeitig wird in der Literatur die Überlegenheit von Strategischen, Dynamischen oder Virtuellen Netzwerken postuliert. Endpunkt ist eine Welt, die nur aus Projekten besteht. Im Bedarfsfall...

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...