We study perfect information games with an infinite horizon played by an arbitrary number of players. This class of games includes infinitely repeated perfect information games, repeated games with asynchronous moves, games with long and short run players, games with overlapping generations of...

We study stochastic games with an infinite horizon and sequential moves played by an arbitrary number of players. We assume that social memory is finite --every player, except possibly one, is finitely lived and cannot observe events that are sufficiently far back in the past. This class of...

We study perfect information games with an infinite horizon played by an arbitrary number of players. This class of games includes infinitely repeated perfect information games, repeated games with asynchronous moves, games with long and short run players, games with overlapping generations of...

We examine contemporaneous perfect E-equilibria, in which a player's actions after every history, evaluated at the point of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within of a best E response. This concept implies, but is stronger than, Radner's ex ante perfect E-equilibrium. A strategy profile...