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Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games

Bhaskar, V. - In: Games and economic behavior 32 (2000) 2, pp. 247-262

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001520852

Asynchronous choice and Markov equilibria

Bhaskar, V.; Vega-Redondo, Fernando - In: Journal of economic theory 103 (2002) 2, pp. 334-350

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001672032

A foundation for Markov equilibria in infinite horizon perfect information games

Bhaskar, V.; Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003902511

A foundation for Markov equilibria with finite social memory

Bhaskar, V.; Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009502451

Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games by V. Bhaskar: comment

Kuzmics, Christoph; Rogers, Brian - In: Games and economic behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 240-242

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009511707

A foundation for Markov equilibria in infinite horizon perfect information games

Bhaskar, V.; Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009665493

Moral hazard and private monitoring

Bhaskar, V.; Damme, Eric E. C. van - In: Journal of economic theory 102 (2002) 1, pp. 16-39

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001661300

A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games

Bhaskar, V. - 2012

We study perfect information games with an infinite horizon played by an arbitrary number of players. This class of games includes infinitely repeated perfect information games, repeated games with asynchronous moves, games with long and short run players, games with overlapping generations of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013098365

A Foundation for Markoiv Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games

Bhaskar, V.; Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204654