I consider a class of dynamic Bayesian games in which types evolve stochastically according to a first-order Markov process on a continuous type space. Types are privately informed, but they become public together with actions when payoffs are obtained, resulting in a delayed information...

This is a corrigendum to Theorem 15 of Jackson and Swinkels (2005) [Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Auctions, Econometrica, 73, 93-140], which proves the existence of equilibrium with positive probability of trade for private value auctions

In this paper, I study the existence and uniqueness of recursive equilibria in economies with aggregate and idiosyncratic risk. Rather than relying on compactness to establish existence, I exploit the monotonicity property of the equilibrium model and rely on arguments from convex analysis. This...

A generalized game is a strategic situation in which agents' behavior restricts their opponents' available action choices, giving rise to interdependencies in terms of what strategy profiles remain mutually feasible. This paper proposes a novel example of a simple generalized game in which the...

In matching markets, the existence of stable matchings can only be guaranteed under substantive restrictions on preferences. We investigate how these results change in large markets, which we model with a continuum of agents of each type, following the work of Aumann (1964) on general...

Uniqueness of equilibrium is a relatively unexplored issue in incomplete markets compared with complete markets. This work shows that one-fund separation is sufficient for the uniqueness of equilibrium in a special class of incomplete markets with two agents and two assets. Specifically, it...

This paper investigates symmetric equilibria in first- and second-price auctions with multidimensional types. The constructed model mirrors the information structure of actual procurement auctions. We demonstrate by a counterexample that symmetric and continuous type distribution is not a...

This paper studies models where the optimal response functions under consideration are non-increasing in endogenous variables, and weakly increasing in exogenous parameters. Such models include games with strategic substitutes, and include cases where additionally, some variables may be...

We consider existence and stability in a simple version of Lee et al. (2005). For a sufficiently large discount factor, a steady state of full-support wealth distribution and pure strategy exists, whereas for an intermediate discount factor, a steady state of mixed strategy exists. Both steady...

I obtain a closed-form solution to a Huggett economy with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility when the vector of individual state variables follows a VAR(1) process with an arbitrary shock distribution. The stationary equilibrium is unique if the income process is AR(1), but not...