We study the effects on the Nash equilibrium of the presence of a structure of social interdependent preferences in a Cournot oligopoly, described in terms of a game in which the network of interactions reflects on the utility functions of firms through a combination of weighted profits of their...

Considering the Cournot oligopoly with interdependent preferences proposed in [5], we analyze the effects of a change in the network of social interactions. Reconsidering some of the main centrality measures proposed in the literature, we show how intercentrality, Bonacich and Friedkin-Jensen...

This paper shows that under very general conditions, there exists a locally stable Nash equilibrium in games of strategic complements (GSC), as well as in the more general case of games with non-decreasing best response correspondences. While it is well known that in such cases a unique...

This chapter of the Handbook of Game Theory (Vol. 3) provides an overview of the theory of Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The starting-point is the rationalistic approach to games and the question whether there exists a convincing, self-enforcing theory of rational behavior in...

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the asymptotic behavior of oligopoly equilibrium in the framework of multilateral exchange when the economy is replicated a finite number of times and show that the sequence of associated price-allocation pair converges to the competitive equilibrium...

In this paper, we fully characterize the Nash Equilibrium in the winner-take-all Bertrand Game, showing that a mixed strategy profile is a Nash Equilibrium, if and only if it is a zero operating profit one, and there exist at least two players whose bids are all unprofitable. Compared with...

In the study we explore an oligopoly market for equilibrium and stability based on statistical data with the help of response functions rather than payoff maximization. To achieve this, we extend the concept of coupled fixed points to triple fixed points. We propose a new model that leads to...

This paper reconciles the Cournot and Bertrand Models of oligopolistic competition, highlighting its weaknesses and giving an opinion thereafter. The pertinent question in this paper is why Cournot (1838) ignored the price and Bertrand (1883) ignored the quantity? From the review, the main...

Within a simple model of homogeneous oligopoly, we show that the traditional ranking between Bertrand and Cournot equilibria may be reversed. For price setting entails a continuum of price equilibria under convex variable costs, departure from marginal cost pricing may be observed. As a...

This paper applies the framework of endogenous timing in games to mixed quantity duopoly, wherein a private domestic or foreign firm competes with a public, welfare maximizing firm. We show that simultaneous play never emerges as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the extended game, in sharp...