This paper analyzes behavior in repeatedly played two-stage games, where players choose actions in both stages according to best replies using 'level-n expectations' about the opponent's actions in both stages. Level-n expectations are recursively defined in a way that a player holding level n...

This paper presents a numerical method for the characterization of Markov-perfect equilibria of symmetric differential games exhibiting coexisting stable steady-states. The method relying on the calculation of 'local value functions' through collocation in overlapping parts of the state space,...

This book deals with the learning behavior of boundedly rational agents in economic systems. In particular, the modeling of learning populations by genetic algorithms is studied in detail. After an extensive review and discussion of the existing literature in the first part, a mathematical...

This book considers the learning behavior of Genetic Algorithms in economic systems with mutual interaction, like markets. Such systems are characterized by a state dependent fitness function and for the first time mathematical results characterizing the long run outcome of genetic learning in...