This note applies the evolutionary dynamic of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob ( Econometrica 61 (1993), 29-65) to class coordination games that the entire population plays simultaneously. In these games, payoffs and best replies are determined by a symmary statistic of the population strategy profile...

This article considers the robustness of long run equilibria when mutation rates are not assumed to be constant over time. Particular attention is paid to the case where mutation rates decline to zero in the limit. It is found that if behaviour is ergodic, then it corresponds to the long run...

We study the effects on the Nash equilibrium of the presence of a structure of social interdependent preferences in a Cournot oligopoly, described in terms of a game in which the network of interactions reflects on the utility functions of firms through a combination of weighted profits of their...

This paper shows that under very general conditions, there exists a locally stable Nash equilibrium in games of strategic complements (GSC), as well as in the more general case of games with non-decreasing best response correspondences. While it is well known that in such cases a unique...

This chapter of the Handbook of Game Theory (Vol. 3) provides an overview of the theory of Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The starting-point is the rationalistic approach to games and the question whether there exists a convincing, self-enforcing theory of rational behavior in...

We consider a basic stochastic evolutionary model with rare mutation and a best-reply (or better-reply) selection mechanism. Following Young's papers, we call a state stochastically stable if its long-term relative frequency of occurrence is bounded away from zero as the mutation rate decreases...

Harris, Reny, and Robson (Econometrica, 1995) add a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when nature's moves are atomless in the original game, SPE obtained via this channel can be...

We study a class of games featuring payoff functions being parabolic cylinders where best reply functions are orthogonal and therefore the pure-strategy non-cooperative solution is attained as a Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies. We prove that the resulting threshold of the discount factor...

This paper studies a dynamic adjustment process in a large society of forward-looking agents where payoffs are given by a normal form supermodular game. The stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage game. It is shown that if the stage game has a monotone...

Static and dynamic games are important tools for the analysis of strategic interactions among economic agents and have found many applications in economics. In many games, equilibria can be described as solutions of polynomial equations. In this paper, we describe state-of-the-art techniques for...