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Every finite noncooperative game can be presented as a weighted network congestion game, and also as a network congestion game with player-specific costs. In the first presentation, different players may contribute differently to congestion, and in the second, they are differently (negatively)...
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Static stability in strategic games differs from dynamic stability in only considering the players' incentives to change their strategies. It does not rely on any assumptions about the players' reactions to these incentives and it is thus not linked with any particular dynamics. This paper...
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Every finite noncooperative game can be presented as a weighted network congestion game, and also as a network congestion game with player-specific costs. In the first presentation, different players may contribute differently to congestion, and in the second, they are differently (negatively)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335972
Different kinds of networks, such as transportation, communication, computer, and supply networks, are susceptible to similar kinds of inefficiencies. These arise when congestion externalities make the cost for each user depend on the other users' choice of routes. If each user chooses the least...
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