Static and dynamic games are important tools for the analysis of strategic interactions among economic agents and have found many applications in economics. In many games, equilibria can be described as solutions of polynomial equations. In this paper, we describe state-of-the-art techniques for...

This paper reviews a framework for numerically analyzing dynamic interactions in imperfectly competitive industries. The framework dates back to Ericson and Pakes [1995. Review of Economic Studies 62, 53–82], but it is based on equilibrium notions that had been available for some time before,...

Refinements of the Nash equilibrium have followed the strategy of extending the idea of subgame perfection to incomplete information games. This has been achieved by appropriately restricting beliefs at unreached information sets. Each new refinement gives stricter and more...

In this paper we study stochastic dynamic games with many players; these are a fundamental model for a wide range of economic applications. The standard solution concept for such games is Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), but it is well known that MPE computation becomes intractable as the...