Showing 1 - 10 of 7,020
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011814908
routinely engage in strategic situations with both: our social network impacts our strategic knowledge. Peer …-confirming equilibrium describes the behavioral consequences of this intuition in a noncooperative game. We augment a game with a network to … represent strategic information: if two players are linked in the network, they have correct conjectures about each others …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012934992
Riley (1979)'s reactive equilibrium concept addresses problems of equilibrium existence in competitive markets with adverse selection. The game-theoretic interpretation of the reactive equilibrium concept in Engers and Fernandez (1987) yields the Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976)/Riley (1979)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010419870
We study a class of discounted, infinite horizon stochastic games with public and private signals and strategic complementarities. Using monotone operators defined on the function space of values and strategies (equipped with a product order), we prove existence of a Stationary Markov Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013108418
We consider a class of equilibrium refinements for finite games in strategic form. The refinements in this family are indexed from least to most restrictive. Proper equilibrium is obtained as a special case within the class; all other concepts are stronger than trembling-hand perfection and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904607
We introduce extended proper equilibrium, which refines proper equilibrium (Myerson, 1978) by adding across-player restrictions on trembles. This refinement coincides with proper equilibrium in games with two players but adds new restrictions in games with three or more players. One implication...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012853769
I study identification of games of incomplete information, both static and dynamic, when there are multiple equilibria in the data. In the case of static games, I show that if multiplicity disappears at a small subset of the support of the observables, payoffs are identified. All the equilibria...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012933771
The notion of communication equilibrium extends Aumann's [3] correlated equilibrium concept for complete information games to the case of incomplete information. This paper shows that this solution concept has the following property: for the class of incomplete information games with compact...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011614260
A coordination game with incomplete information is played through time. In each period, payoffs depend on a fundamental state and an additional idiosyncratic shock. Fundamentals evolve according to a random walk where the changes in fundamentals (namely common shocks) have a fat tailed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011573294
Static stability in strategic games differs from dynamic stability in only considering the players' incentives to change their strategies. It does not rely on any assumptions about the players' reactions to these incentives and it is thus not linked with any particular dynamics. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700788