This paper presents a model of Rule of Law in which a continuum of agents plays against the State for the appropriation of the economic assets of a stylised economy. The model shows how each agent can either challenge the State or acquiesce, with the latter having the choice of either protecting...

We analyse the effect of the uncertainty about the fundamentals on the probability of sudden stops of capital flows from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Our model predicts that the probability of crises increases with the uncertainty, ie. the dispersion of private signals about the true...

This paper analyzes the impact of uncertainty on the spread of stock market crises, both theoretically and empirically. The effect of uncertainty about the fundamentals on investment decisions is an important cause of financial crises propagating across countries. Firstly, a coordination game on...

We analyse the effect of the uncertainty about the fundamentals on the probability of sudden stops of capital flows from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Our model predicts that the probability of crises increases with the uncertainty, ie. the dispersion of private signals about the true...

This paper analyzes the impact of uncertainty on the spread of stock market crises, both theoretically and empirically. The effect of uncertainty about the fundamentals on investment decisions is an important cause of financial crises propagating across countries. Firstly, a coordination game on...

How do banks choose their debt maturity structure when credit markets are subject to information frictions? This paper proposes a model of equilibrium maturity choice with asymmetric information and endogenous roll-over risk. We show that in the presence of public signals about firms'...

The industrialization process of a country is often plagued by a failure to coordinate investment decisions. Using the Global Games approach we can solve this coordination problem and eliminate the problem of multiple equilibria. We show how appropriate information provision enhances efficiency....

Theories about unique equilibrium selection are often rejected in experimental investigations. We drop the idea of selecting a single prominent equilibrium but suggest the coexistence of different beliefs about "appropriate" equilibrium or non-equilibrium play. Our main selection criterion is...

This paper proposes a theory of shadow bank runs in the presence of sponsor liquidity support. We show that liquidity lines designed to insulate shadow banks from market and funding liquidity risk can be destabilizing, as they provide them with incentives to acquire private information about...

I argue that systemic bankruptcy of firms can originate from coordination failure in an economy with investment complementarities. This new explanation about the origin of systemic bankruptcy promotes better understanding of how financial fragility arises, and provides theoretical guidance for...