This research contributes to the theory of cost-reducing R&D investments by offering a tractable three-stage non-cooperative Cournot duopoly game in which R&D-investing firms choose whether to disclose R&D-related information to the rival. Though in a noncooperative context firms have no...

This research contributes to the theory of cost-reducing R&D investments by offering a tractable three-stage non-cooperative Cournot duopoly game in which R&D-investing firms choose whether to disclose R&D-related information to the rival. Though in a noncooperative context firms have no...

We show that political booms, measured by the rise in governments' popularity, predict financial crises above and beyond other better-known early warning indicators, such as credit booms. This predictive power, however, only holds in emerging economies. We show that governments in emerging...

We analyze the roles of the government and the incumbent in preventing piracy, and the reasons and incentives why a pirate would want to be a leader in prices. The framework of analysis used is a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation with price competition, where both incumbent and...