Policies of lowering carbon demand may aggravate instead of alleviate climate change (green paradox). In a two‐period, three‐country general equilibrium model with finite endowment of fossil fuel, one country enforces an emissions cap in the first or second periods. When that cap is...

In this paper we consider a competitive economy with flows of materials from extraction via recycling to landfilling which exhibits distortions due to pollution, external landfilling costs and inefficient product design. The allocative impact of tax-subsidy policies aiming at internalizing the...

This paper examines strategic incentives to subsidize green energy in a group of countries that operates an international carbon emissions trading scheme. Welfare-maximizing national governments have the option to discriminate against energy from fossil fuels by subsidizing green energy,...

Internalizing the global negative externality of carbon emissions requires flattening the extraction path of non-renewable fossil-fuel resources (= world carbon emissions). Following Eichner and Pethig (2011b) we set up a two-country two-period model in which one of the countries represents a...

Internalizing the global negative externality of carbon emissions requires flattening the extraction path of world fossil energy resources (= world carbon emissions). We consider governments having sign-unconstrained emission taxes at their disposal and seeking to prevent world emissions from...

This note investigates the suitability of unilateral consumption taxes for alleviating climate change in a two-period two-country general equilibrium model with a finite stock of fossil fuel. We analyze the incidence of a unilateral consumption tax in the first period on world carbon emissions....